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Abstract Although the US government has made important
improvements in chemical management since the 1970s, these
advances have not kept pace with scientific knowledge about
chemical hazards. While US federal chemical policy reform is
being debated for the first time since 1976, some US busi-
nesses have voluntarily sought to improve their knowledge of
chemical hazards in their supply chains, and several US states,
the European Union, China, and other countries have moved
forward with chemical policy reforms. Until policy reforms
occur in the USA, the US chemical market will continue to
experience problems associated with poor information on
hazardous chemicals in supply chains. These market condi-
tions make it difficult for consumer product companies to
identify hazards and create safer products. Results from inter-
views with consumer product company representatives dem-
onstrate that challenges in obtaining chemical-related infor-
mation exist across sectors, and information on chemical
hazards and uses can be conflicting, protected by trade secrets,
lost in supply chains, or nonexistent. Interview results illus-
trate how some consumer product companies are exceeding
regulatory requirements by voluntarily restricting from their
products chemicals that could harm human health or the
environment. Understanding the motivations behind—and
barriers to—these actions could inform efforts to modernize
US chemicals policies in ways that promote effective chemi-
cal management in supply chains. Using examples from the
European Union and some US states, we introduce policy
suggestions that would increase knowledge, market transpar-
ency, and information flows regarding hazardous chemicals
and their uses; these would support the efforts of companies to
develop and market safer products.
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Information asymmetry .Market failure . Human and
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Introduction
Industrial chemicals have become a central part of modern
life, contributing to improvements in society’s infrastructure
and advances in medicine and technology. Since 1979, more
than 84,000 chemicals have been registered for use in the
USA (USEPA 2010), with over 700 newly registered
chemicals entering commerce each year (USGAO 2005).
Along with the significant increase in chemicals in commerce
comes the need to better understand and prevent their potential
adverse effects on human health and the environment.
The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1976, which
governs the manufacture, importation, distribution, and use of
industrial chemicals, was intended to give the US Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) the authority to (1) obtain
hazard and exposure information from chemical manufac-
turers, and (2) regulate chemicals that pose an “unreasonable
risk” to human health or the environment (USEPA 2010;
USGAO 2005). In practice, however, shortcomings in the
law have severely limited EPA’s ability to meet these
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objectives; only four existing chemicals or chemical clas-
ses have been successfully restricted under TSCA’s formal
rule-making process since its passage, and EPA has been
able to require chemical producers to conduct safety test-
ing on an additional 200 out of the tens of thousands of
chemicals in commerce (Denison 2009; Wilson and
Schwarzman 2009). Thus, over 35 years after the passage of
TSCA, substantial knowledge gaps exist about the health and
environmental effects of the great majority of chemicals on the
market.
As a consequence of TSCA’s weaknesses, chemicals
suspected of being hazardous have remained on the market
and are found in numerous consumer and commercial prod-
ucts, including some to which children would likely be ex-
posed (e.g., Shapiro 2007; Stapleton et al. 2011; Taylor 2010).
Downstream businesses that purchase and use chemicals have
been left on their own with the burden of identifying and
managing potentially hazardous chemicals in their supply
chains. Meanwhile, the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention have detected hundreds of industrial chemicals in a
representative sample of American children and adults
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2009). Many of
these chemicals have been linked to adverse health effects, but
for the majority, there is too little information to understand
their potential for long-term harm (e.g., Wilson and
Schwarzman 2009; Woodruff et al. 2011). Despite the chal-
lenges in establishing a cause and effect relationship,1 experts
estimate that the environmental contribution to disease may
explain a quarter to a third of the global disease burden
(Bergman et al. 2013; WHO 2013). In addition to human
health effects, environmental contamination continues to
erode biodiversity and ecosystem health worldwide (e.g.,
Falconer et al. 2006; Schwarzman and Wilson 2009).
This paper presents a brief analysis of TSCA’s weak-
nesses, followed by examples of governmental and volun-
tary initiatives that aim to improve chemical management.
We then summarize recent research that demonstrates the
impacts of weak chemicals policies on proactive busi-
nesses and the limitations of voluntary initiatives. The re-
search results provide insights into the gaps that exist in
current laws and how those laws might be strengthened.
Based on these findings and analysis of different policy op-
tions, we offer suggestions on how policy improvements
could help shift the chemical market in ways that would lead
to investments by industry in the design of safer chemicals,
and—over time—reductions in the health and environmental
impacts of toxic substances.
TSCA’s limitations
Information on the hazards and uses of many chemicals has
been difficult to collect because TSCA “grandfathered” the
approximately 62,000 chemicals in use at the time of its
enactment, exempting them from toxicity screening require-
ments. Even for chemicals introduced after TSCA’s passage,
producers are not routinely required to generate and disclose
to EPA information about their potential hazards or risks
(USGAO 2005, 2009; Wilson and Schwarzman 2009). Fur-
ther, chemical producers can claimmuch of the data submitted
to EPA under TSCA as confidential business information,
thereby concealing it from consumers, workers, government
officials, emergency responders, and consumer product
manufacturers.
Chemical hazard assessment and risk management by EPA
are hampered primarily because TSCA’s legal and procedural
requirements impede the Agency’s ability to both control and
require industry testing of chemicals suspected of presenting
risks to health or the environment (USGAO 2009; Wilson and
Schwarzman 2009). Instead of chemical producers, it is the
EPA—at public expense—that is assigned responsibility un-
der TSCA to gather data sufficient to assess chemical hazards
(USGAO 2005; 2009). In assigning EPA the “burden of
proof,” TSCA requires the agency to meet a high standard
of evidence—one that is virtually unreachable using the tools
of modern science. Thus, few of the approximately 84,000
chemicals in commerce have been tested or restricted since
TSCA’s enactment, and EPA has resorted to encouraging
business participation in voluntary chemical management
programs, in place of regulatory action (USGAO 2005;
Wilson and Schwarzman 2009).
Organizations across the political spectrum, from health
and environmental advocacy groups to the chemical industry,
now agree that TSCA should be modernized, though exactly
what form a new law should take is contested (Hogue and
Erickson 2012). TSCA reform legislation has been introduced
in both Houses of the US Congress during the past several
years, though no legislative reforms have been passed.
Notable government responses to chemical policy gaps
New regulations in Europe have emerged as an example of
what is possible for comprehensive chemical management.
Individual US states have also taken the initiative to create
their own chemicals policies, which range from individual
chemical bans to more far-reaching programs.
Europe’s REACH
In response to problems with weak chemicals policies that
mirrored the problems of TSCA, the European Union passed
1 Linking specific chemicals used in consumer products to negative
effects in humans or wildlife can be challenging because the effects
may manifest years after exposure, or they may appear in the exposed
organisms’ offspring. Assessing exposure retrospectively is inherently
inexact. In the context of human exposure, there may also be synergistic,
additive, or antagonistic effects at play (Carpenter et al. 2002).
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sweeping 2006 legislation on the Registration, Evaluation,
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH). The
law applies to all chemicals (both new and existing), including
those inmixtures and articles, produced in or imported into the
European Union. Because REACH extends to imports, the
law has received considerable international attention. Busi-
nesses around the world must comply as a condition of
retaining access to the European market. Other countries,
including China, India, and Japan, are using REACH as a
model for their own chemicals policies, which is leading to a
global shift in chemical management.
REACH requires information reporting by companies that
produce or import chemicals in quantities greater than 1 t/
producer/year; data and information reporting requirements
are phased in through 2018 and tiered according to the volume
and type of chemical that is produced or imported (REACH
2006). REACH differs from TSCA in important ways as
follows: (1) chemical producers must provide basic informa-
tion on the identity and chemical properties of their products
as a condition of access to the European market; (2) producers
of chemicals designated as “Substances of very high concern”
are required to gain authorization from the European
Chemicals Agency for continued use; (3) at minimum, basic
information on chemicals must be communicated in supply
chains to allow for safe use; and (4) substitution of chemicals
of concern with less dangerous alternatives is encouraged, and
in some cases required, when viable alternatives exist
(REACH 2006; Schwarzman and Wilson 2009).
Prior to passage of REACH, the European Commission
estimated that the regulation could yield potential long-term
public health benefits that outweigh projected costs to industry
tenfold (European Commission 2003). Five years after
REACH’s enactment, the Commission conducted a review
to ensure that the regulation was on track to achieving the
expected benefits. In short, the Commission believes that
REACH is functioning well and has made chemical use in
the European Union safer due to increased availability of
chemical-related data and improved risk management. How-
ever, it identified several areas needing adjustment. Chief
among these were the need to improve the quality of data
submitted by industry and better enforcement of the regulation
by Member States (European Commission 2013).
US state activities
In reaction to perceived policy voids at the federal level, more
than 900 chemical-related initiatives were proposed or enacted
by state and local governments between 1990 and 2009
(Schifano et al. 2009). In 2012 alone, lawmakers in 28 states
considered legislation to reduce their residents’ exposures to
potentially hazardous chemicals in consumer products; the
proposed legislation ranged from phasing out certain flame
retardants and bisphenol A, to requirements that manufacturers
disclose product ingredients to consumers (Hogue 2012). Sev-
eral states, including California, Maine, Massachusetts, and
Washington, are moving towardmore comprehensive chemical
management policies that aim to increase information avail-
ability, identify chemicals of concern, promote green chemistry
education, implement strategies for assessing alternatives, and
expand pollution prevention.
State actions can affect federal regulations and industry
operations alike. As illustrated by the federal Toxics Release
Inventory, which was based on Maryland and New Jersey
programs, successful state-based initiatives can provide
models for federal programs (Rabe 2010). But while state-
based programs can serve as important progenitors and are
sometimes necessary in their own right (Denison 2009), states
generally do not have the regulatory influence to reform an
entire industry, and—from industry’s perspective—chemical
regulations that vary dramatically among states can compli-
cate interstate commerce and industry operations. As a con-
sequence, business organizations historically have preferred
uniform federal policies (Hoffman 2001).
Voluntary responses to chemical policy gaps
US federal government programs
EPA has launched some 50 voluntary programs since the mid-
1980s that ask industry to provide information that the agency
cannot access through regulatory channels (Press and
Mazmanian 2010). Many of these programs have one of two
general goals: collecting data on health and environmental
hazards or encouraging pollution prevention. Programs in
the first category have typically struggled for lack of partici-
pation and data disclosure. For example, the High Production
Volume (HPV) Challenge program2 “challenged” chemical
companies that produced or imported the greatest quantities
of chemicals to make publically available certain data on their
products’ health and environmental effects (USEPA 2013a).
However, the program has been criticized for poor data qual-
ity, significant delays in promised data, and hundreds of
“unsponsored” chemicals (Denison 2007). Programs encour-
aging pollution prevention have arguably had more success,
though their impact is harder to assess. For instance, Design
for the Environment (DfE),3 which relies on EPA collabora-
tions with industry, environmental groups, and academia to
advance safer products and green chemistry, has engaged
numerous partners since 1992. Over 2,500 products, mostly
cleaners and detergents, carry EPA’s DfE logo (USEPA
2 See http://www.epa.gov/hpv/for more information on EPA’s HPV
Challenge program (EPA 2013a).
3 See http://www.epa.gov/dfe/for more information on EPA’s DfE
partnership program (EPA 2013b).
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2013b); while a laudable achievement, it is difficult to gauge
its overall impact on health and the environment given the vast
number of products on the market.
Private sector initiatives
The private sector has also responded to the aforementioned
gaps in chemical regulations. Some chemical producers and
chemical users (e.g., consumer product companies) have de-
signed and adopted chemical management programs that suit
their needs and interests.
While chemical producers and their trade associations have
historically resisted chemical policy reforms (Hogue 2009;
Press and Mazmanian 2010), the industry has also suffered
from a negative public image (McCoy 2011). In an attempt to
address both of these issues, the International Council of
Chemical Associations launched the chemical industry’s vol-
untary Responsible Care® program shortly following the
1984 Bhopal disaster. Responsible Care® requires member
companies to take actions that would make their operations
and products safer and more sustainable (International
Council of Chemical Associations 2010). However, critics
charge that the initiative was created for the sole purpose of
repairing damage to the industry’s reputation and avoiding or
softening possible regulations (Hook 1996; King and Lenox
2000; Press and Mazmanian 2010). Researchers have found
that Responsible Care® members do not have superior envi-
ronmental performance compared to non-members, largely
because—in the absence of sanctions and other penalties—
opportunistic behavior appears to override institutional pres-
sures for self-regulation (King and Lenox 2000). Further,
since the program operates in tandem with industry lobbying
to weaken public health and environmental legislation, it is
not widely viewed as a credible force for improving health and
environmental protections (Press and Mazmanian 2010).
Some individual US chemical companies are voluntarily
responding to the lack of available chemical-related informa-
tion. For example, Dow and DuPont have made their prod-
ucts’ Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) available online
(Dow 2010; DuPont 2010). While MSDSs may be useful in
certain circumstances, they have been criticized for lacking
substance and depth (Nicol et al. 2008), and many consumer
product companies do not consider MSDSs to be a useful tool
for informing the design of safer products (Scruggs and
Ortolano 2011).
Consumer product companies, especially those with highly
visible brands, have strong incentives to avoid or reduce
hazardous chemicals associated with their products (Seuring
and Müller 2008). Despite these incentives, even highly mo-
tivated consumer product companies face significant barriers
to eliminating hazardous chemicals from their products and
manufacturing processes. Most notably, the paucity of avail-
able data on chemical hazards and the lack of communication
on chemical use in supply chains hinder their ability to iden-
tify hazardous chemicals and select safer chemicals for sub-
stitution (Guth et al. 2007).
Learning from proactive consumer product companies’
experiences
We conducted an interview-based study to examine: (1) the
challenges that consumer product companies face in making
safer products, and (2) the strategies to improve chemical
management that some proactive companies have voluntarily
adopted. We interviewed environmental managers from a
diverse set of multinational companies that several non-
governmental organizations and government agencies4 con-
sidered to be leaders in chemical management. Sampling was
not representative since the interview set included only the
willing participants from a small group of proactive compa-
nies identified by governmental and nonprofit entities. Twenty
companies from the USA and Europe were included in the
sample; data were gathered in 2009, before the European
companies experienced any benefits of REACH, so their
situation then was comparable to that of US companies today.
The sample included companies from a wide array of
business sectors that we grouped into the following five
categories: telecom and IT, apparel, retail, construction and
home goods, and transportation. One or two environmental
managers from each company were interviewed, depending
on whom had the kinds of company-specific knowledge
needed to participate. Each interviewee was personally in-
volved in designing and/or implementing the chemical man-
agement program for his or her company, and most inter-
viewees had science backgrounds.
Interviewees participated in in-depth, semi-structured in-
terviews that were typically 60–80 min in length. Thirteen
interviews were conducted in person and the remaining seven
were conducted by telephone. Each interview was digitally
recorded and transcribed. The transcriptions were systemati-
cally coded and analyzed using HyperRESEARCH™
software.
The interviews provided insights into gaps in chemical
regulations and the information and tools companies need to
fill those gaps in order to produce goods that are safer for
health and the environment. Findings relevant to the argument
of this public policy research paper are summarized below.5
4 These non-governmental organizations and government agencies spe-
cialized in working to protect human and environmental health from
hazardous chemicals. They worked with companies on chemical man-
agement issues, and had knowledge of companies’ proactive chemical
management strategies that was not publically available.
5 For extensive details on all research results, see Scruggs and Ortolano
(2011) and Scruggs (2013).
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Challenges in obtaining information
All of the companies we interviewed faced challenges in
obtaining chemical-related information. Quite simply, they
had difficulties identifying the chemicals in their materials
and products because such information was not routinely
communicated to them in useable forms in their supply chains.
Companies tried to obtain this information from actors
throughout their supply chains, and some tested random sam-
ples of materials and products to verify that certain undesir-
able chemicals were not present. Other companies resorted to
requiring full material disclosure from their suppliers, some-
times enforcing penalties for noncompliance (e.g., not
allowing suppliers to be paid until all necessary data had been
provided).
Companies also had problems accessing complete and
reliable information about hazards associated with chemicals
they used or wanted to use in their products. Interviewees said
that they searched for this information using numerous exter-
nal resources: the internet; materials safety data sheets (though
most companies did not find them to be very useful); proposed
regulations around the world; government studies on the
hazards associated with certain chemicals; industry associa-
tions; peer-reviewed literature; non-governmental organiza-
tion (NGO) campaigns; media reports; consumer associations;
databases (e.g., the Toxicology Data Network (TOXNET));
expert lists and classifications (e.g., the Substitute It Now List
and California’s Proposition 65 List of Chemicals); indepen-
dent certification schemes (e.g., Oeko-tex® and GUT); and
independent consulting scientists. This approach to finding
chemical hazard information was complicated by the fact that
information from different sources could be conflicting or
confusing, and information regarding a chemical’s safe use
could be unknown or unclear for a given application. Inter-
viewees also explained that the information they sought often
could be unavailable, protected by trade secrets, or “lost” in
supply chains.
Interviewees characterized their companies’ supply chains
as vast and complex, which exacerbated their information-
gathering challenges. Most interviewees encountered commu-
nication problems in their supply chains and felt that transpar-
ency was lacking. Another frequent complaint was the lack of
common systems to effectively manage and communicate
chemical information in their supply chains. Interviewees
found that regulations and tools that might simplify produc-
tion of safer products, such as standardized data sheets and
internationally recognized test methods, were either inade-
quate or nonexistent.
These findings document the types of chemical-related
information deficits and needs experienced by consumer prod-
uct companies across sectors that prevent them from making
informed purchasing decisions based on complete informa-
tion. Companies not only struggle to obtain information about
the identities of and hazards associated with the chemicals
they want to use in their products, but, as a consequence, also
have difficulty identifying safer substitutes for chemicals of
concern. This hinders companies’ abilities to innovate safer
products.
Proactive chemical management practices
The 20 companies created their own chemical management
strategies to improve their awareness and minimize their use
of currently unregulated, but potentially hazardous, chemicals
in their products. Each company’s chemical management
strategy was unique, tailored to suit its products and needs,
and based on data the company collected for its own use.
The elements of the companies’ chemical management
strategies generally focused on either: (1) finding or generat-
ing data about chemical hazards and making those data more
user friendly for internal use, or (2) enhancing communica-
tions with the many actors in their supply chains. Companies
reported that many of the elements from the first category
were useful in minimizing potentially hazardous chemicals in
their products. Examples included: restricted substance lists,
which comprised unregulated, but potentially hazardous,
chemicals that were forbidden from use by suppliers; chemical
phase-out programs and research on safer substitute
chemicals; searchable databases including information about
chemical hazards and uses to streamline chemical manage-
ment; and risk management and assessment tools to help
determine which chemicals were appropriate for different
applications. The value of these strategies was limited by the
quality of the data the companies were able to collect, which
depended, in part, on the resources the company was willing
and able to put toward data collection.
To improve the communication of chemical information in
supply chains, companies used a variety of approaches, in-
cluding the following: supplier training on chemical use and
reporting; forms that asked suppliers for specific information
(and in some cases full disclosure) about the chemical content
of supplied materials and products; and product testing or
supplier audits to verify that supply chain communication on
chemical use worked as planned. Based on the interviewees’
communications with suppliers and interactions with their
competitors, they did not perceive such practices to be routine
for most consumer product companies; these practices are
therefore considered to be innovative here.
The interviews also revealed the broader supply chain
challenges companies faced in implementing their voluntary
chemical management programs. In order to create programs
that produced both adequate communication in the supply
chain and reliable data, companies with effective strategies
devoted a continual stream of resources to training suppliers,
staying abreast of new chemical data, and refining company
strategies as new information surfaced.
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Motivations for minimizing potentially hazardous chemicals
in consumer products
The interviewees could not predict which chemicals would
eventually be found to be dangerous or become the focus of
NGO or media campaigns. Thus, they designed their chemical
management strategies to restrict the use of, or find substitutes
for, as many potentially hazardous chemicals as possible.
Many interviewees described how their strategies helped them
“stay ahead” of regulations, which allowed them to work at
their own pace, maintain product quality, and ensure access to
needed resources. Interviewees described watching their com-
petitors react to new regulations: they struggled to find solu-
tions and lost sales in the process, as it can sometimes take
years to find safer substitute chemicals. Interviewees also said
that avoiding negative publicity was critical to protecting their
companies’ corporate reputations. Many of the companies had
either: (1) suffered the consequences of negative publicity in
the past, or (2) conducted surveys to learn that their customers
expected them only to sell products that were safe and ethi-
cally sound and trusted the companies to deliver on this
expectation. Companies used elements from their chemical
management strategies (described in the previous subsections)
to try to ensure that dangerous chemicals did not end up in
their products, since this could lead to damaging media cov-
erage, NGO actions, and loss of consumer confidence.
While proactive consumer product companies worked to
build trust with informed stakeholders, such as NGOs and
government entities, most of the companies handled relation-
ships with consumers differently. Companies generally did not
aggressively advertise their chemical management strategies
directly to consumers, largely because they did not want to
awaken scrutiny about product safety by disrupting the “tak-
en-for-granted” consumer belief that consumer products are
safe.6 Several interviewees said that most of their customers
did not think about the fact that consumer products are com-
posed of chemicals. Some companies also wanted to avoid
alarming customers with older model products about chemical
eliminations from newer models. Other interviewees de-
scribed watching their competitors advertise and launch
“green” products: the products were harshly criticized by
NGOs for not being “green enough,” prompting withdrawal
of the products from the market. This is not to say that the
interviewed companies lacked transparency around their
chemical management activities—they included information
about chemicals and product safety on their websites and
provided multiple avenues for customers to ask questions
and make comments. But in general, in an effort to avoid an
association between chemical-related problems and their
products, companies kept their chemical management work
in the background. This is an unusual strategy for brand
differentiation, reputation protection, or gaining a competitive
advantage, in that it derives from a desire to avoid negative
attention. These findings illustrate the ways in which current
chemicals policies disincentivize an open dialogue around
improving product safety.
Looking to the future of US chemicals policy
Traditional risk assessment approach to regulation
Agencies such as the US EPA have historically used a prob-
abilistic risk assessment approach to make regulatory deci-
sions. The approach includes three sequential steps: (1)
research—collect available scientific data on a chemical’s
adverse health and environmental effects; (2) risk
assessment—gather information regarding exposure levels
and likely consequences; and (3) risk management—consider
regulatory alternatives and propose a plan (Rosenbaum 2014).
There is uncertainty inherent in the information underlying
each step of this approach. Not surprisingly, in light of the
shortcomings of TSCA, data are usually missing, incomplete,
or extrapolated from animal models; long-term adverse health
and environmental effects are often unknown (since many
chemicals have come onto the market only recently) and
chronic effects can be difficult to study. At the same time,
the risk assessment approach to decision-making requires high
levels of scientific evidence to justify regulation and allows
for delayed action based on scientific uncertainty. For these
reasons, Ashford (2007) argues that the approach benefits
industrial and producer interests while undermining public
health and the environment. In the context of an often-
contentious political process that typically includes the pros-
pect of judicial review, sorting out the science can take years,
if not decades (Rosenbaum 2014). In the meantime, hazardous
chemicals remain on the market.
Limitations of voluntary approaches
Reliance on voluntary approaches to chemical management
perpetuates a classic source of market failure: information
asymmetry.7 In this case, chemical producers have more in-
formation about the chemicals they sell than they are required
to disclose to the downstream manufacturers of consumer
products that use those chemicals. In a well-functioning mar-
ket, chemical producers would respond to downstream com-
panies’ needs and preferences for additional information,
which would enable those companies to make more informed
decisions and, potentially, use that information to manufacture
6 See Suchman (1995) for more on the notion of taken-for-granted
beliefs.
7 See Reinhardt (1999) and Rosen and Gayer (2008) for more on infor-
mation asymmetries and market failure.
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safer consumer products and identify safer substitutes (Guth
et al. 2007).
Furthermore, while voluntary approaches may reduce haz-
ardous chemicals in some companies’ products, they are
inefficient from a societal perspective. Voluntary schemes
require each company to individually research and assess
(sometimes confusing and conflicting) information about each
chemical they use and make individual determinations regard-
ing the chemical’s safety under a range of possible exposure
scenarios. Companies duplicate each other’s work and, be-
cause of gaps in both chemical hazard information and tech-
nical knowledge at the company level, may come to different
conclusions about the risks to health and the environment
from chemicals in their products. Relying on voluntary ap-
proaches is also incomplete; despite the actions of some in-
dustry leaders, the great majority of consumer product com-
panies are not investing resources in voluntarily gathering the
additional information they need to improve product safety.
In brief, absent requirements that chemical producers and
other upstream actors in supply chains communicate adequate
information about chemical hazards to their buyers, consumer
product companies are left with two choices: do nothing, or
pay the costs of developing ad hoc approaches to chemical
management. Only a handful of proactive companies appear
to be taking the latter approach.
A regulatory approach grounded in the precautionary
principle
The limitations associated with managing chemicals using a
risk assessment approach have led some to advocate use of the
precautionary principle. Since obtaining scientific certainty
regarding a chemical’s harmful effects is difficult, if not im-
possible, to establish in a timely manner, a precautionary
approach to regulation opts for preventive action based on
the best available data, before exhaustive studies have been
completed and widespread harm has occurred (Ashford and
Miller 1998). This approach also shifts the burden of proof to
chemical producers to demonstrate that their products are
reasonably safe, and facilitates the movement toward safer
chemicals and processes through improved transparency
(Rosenbaum 2014). Such improvements in information flows
would enable consumer product companies to: (1) understand
hazards associated with the chemicals in their products, (2)
determine chemicals’ suitability for different product applica-
tions, and (3) identify or develop safer alternatives.
Scholars have demonstrated that the precautionary princi-
ple can guide decision-making in the face of uncertainty to
spur innovation and economic growth. By using all available
evidence to encourage full consideration of uncertainties and
thorough assessment of alternatives, the focus shifts from
problem characterization to solution identification (Tickner
et al. 2003; Tickner and Geiser 2004). For example, this
approach challenges chemical users to fully understand their
use of chemicals and materials in order to analyze options that
exclude potential hazards. New chemical substances or tech-
nologies may be identified, which accomplish the same ob-
jectives as those they are replacing, but without the hazards
(Tickner et al. 2003). Further, alternatives assessment has
proven to lead to outcomes that are both economically advan-
tageous and beneficial to public health and the environment
(Tickner and Geiser 2004; Zwetsloot and Ashford 2003).
Improving the quality and transparency of information on
chemicals is prerequisite to stimulating market demand for,
and innovation of, safer substances. It also helps governments
identify, prioritize, and take action on chemicals that pose
risks to health and the environment. The European Union’s
REACH regulation illustrates how producers of chemicals
and materials can help close data gaps about the hazards and
risks of tens of thousands of chemicals on the market for
which there is currently little publicly available information.8
REACH also demonstrates approaches to improving commu-
nication of information about chemical identities, properties,
and uses through supply chains so that exposures and risks can
be better understood. Policymakers in the USAwould benefit
by examining REACH’s potential for addressing the deficits
in US chemical policy and evaluating its ability to support
consumer product companies in making safer products.
In brief, the interviews conducted with consumer product
companies demonstrated a need for chemical hazard informa-
tion in useable forms, as well as tools to improve communi-
cation of chemical information in supply chains. These are
needs to which US policy makers can respond; improving the
quality and transparency of chemical information would help
reduce persistent information asymmetries and thereby im-
prove the economic efficiency of resource allocations.
Based on the interview results described above and previ-
ously developed theoretical arguments for chemical policy
reform (Schwarzman and Wilson 2009; Wilson and
Schwarzman 2009), Table 1 summarizes elements of TSCA
reform that—if enacted—would support the efforts of con-
sumer product companies to develop safer products.
Precautionary approaches in action
In the European Union and in some US states, new chemicals
policies are increasingly informed by precautionary ap-
proaches. In both contexts, governments are taking steps to
improve information transparency, promote safer alternatives,
and shift the burden of proof to chemical producers. The
results of our interview-based study, discussed above, suggest
that these actions would improve the ability of proactive
8 See Denison (2009) for recommendations on ensuring credibility of
industry-generated data.
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downstream companies to assess the safety of chemicals and
chemical products in their supply chains.
Closing data gaps and addressing information transparency
REACH’s registration provision makes the reporting of basic
chemical identity and hazardous properties a condition of entry to
the European Union market for tens of thousands of chemicals.
The data emerging from REACH registrations, including ex-
panded data for higher volume and higher hazard chemicals,
and the communication of information in supply chains, stand to
significantly increase the amount of chemical hazard information
available to companies, and—potentially—to the public.
Information transparency is also promoted by Washington
State’s 2008 Children’s Safe Products Act. It created an online
database in which manufacturers report on the presence of 66
“chemicals of concern” in products made or marketed for
children. Washington expects that the availability of informa-
tion on hazards in children’s products could lead to a “virtuous
cycle” of disclosure, assessment, and product improvement
(Washington State Legislature 2013).
Promoting substitution with safer alternatives
Under California’s Safer Consumer Products (SCP) Regula-
tions, the state’s Department of Toxic Substances Control is in
the process of:
& Establishing a set of chemicals of concern,
& Identifying consumer products that contain those
chemicals, and
& Requiring producers or retailers of those products to ana-
lyze alternatives to chemicals of concern so that safer
processes or chemicals can be used.
The SCP regulations establish criteria for comparing im-
pacts of potential alternatives and ask companies to investi-
gate solutions, including the possibility of completely elimi-
nating chemicals of concern from their products (California
Department of Toxic Substances Control 2013). While the
SCP regulations do not produce new chemical hazard infor-
mation, and the scope will likely be limited to 3–5 chemical-
product combinations per year, the new regulations are nota-
ble in that they require companies to seek safer substitutes to
chemical hazards in consumer products. The regulations aim
to avoid the history of unintended consequences that result
from chemical bans made in the absence of guidance on the
selection of appropriate substitutes (Massey 2008).
Consumer product companies generally seek to continu-
ously improve their products, usually by maximizing perfor-
mance features; the SCP regulations require that they also
undertake continuous improvement aimed at improving the
safety of their chemical constituents. For companies that have
been asking these questions of their supply chains for years,
the California law will help to level the playing field with their
competitors who have not previously been required to seek
safer alternatives for hazardous chemicals in their products.
Protecting future generations and shifting the burden of proof
In its most explicitly precautionary element, REACH gives
government the ability to restrict a chemical irrespective of its
toxicity if it is designated as a “very persistent, very
bioaccumulative” substance, or “vPvB.” This designation is
based on the notion that a substance that resists degradation will
remain in the environment for decades and accumulate in biota.
Because concentrations in organisms rise as a substance accu-
mulates up the food chain, a vPvB chemical has the potential to
cause damage for many years. In its approach to vPvBs,
Table 1 TSCA reform features that would support creation of safer consumer products
Current US chemicals policy Goals for reformed US chemicals policy
Information on chemical hazards Not required of companies, tightly controlled,
centralized, redacted, incomplete,
non-standardized
Required, transparent, distributed throughout markets,
comprehensive, standardized
Generator of hazard information Government, at public expense Producers, at industry expense
Burden of proof Assigned to government to prove a risk Assigned to producers to demonstrate reasonable safety
Default marketing assumption Producer places products on the market, awaits
government to find and prove risk
Producer demonstrates safety of products to government
as a condition of market access
Key drivers of the chemical and
product market
Function, price, performance Function, price, performance, safety
Trigger for government to take action Demonstrable damage to health or environment,
clear evidence of cause and effect
Best available data, balance of evidence, early
warnings of harm, action despite uncertainties
Overall objective Government to identify, target, document, legally
defend, and eventually reduce the production and
sale of the most toxic chemicals on the market.
Government to improve transparency and accountability
in the market to reduce the competitive advantage of
toxic chemicals and open opportunities for the design
of new classes of chemicals and products that are safer
for health and the environment
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REACH is the first regulation with an explicitly precautionary
approach to a category of chemicals whose risks are not yet fully
understood, but whose impact could last for generations
(Schwarzman and Wilson 2009).
Under REACH, authorization for continued use of
chemicals designated as substances of very high concern
(which includes vPvBs) will hinge on producers demonstrat-
ing the safety of each intended use, or in the absence of
suitable alternatives, that the socioeconomic benefits out-
weigh the health and environmental risks (Schwarzman and
Wilson 2009). In this respect, REACH shifts the burden of
proof of safety to chemical manufacturers.
Conclusion
Chemical policy has been described as a classically “wicked
problem” for which no easy solutions exist (Allen 2013). On
the other hand, a comprehensive approach to chemical policy
could potentially improve the safety of thousands of consumer
and commercial products, as well as the workplaces where
they aremanufactured and used. This would deliver substantial
benefits to health and the environment. New policies could
create market conditions that would respond more efficiently
to preferences of both consumer product companies and mem-
bers of the public who make decisions based on chemical
safety as well as performance, price, and function. Given the
widely acknowledged shortcomings of TSCA, US legislators
should consider introducing modernized chemicals policies
that: (1) eliminate barriers to chemical-related information
flows to ensure that chemical users have access to adequate
information, and (2) provide EPAwith the necessary legal and
procedural tools to efficiently identify and take action on
hazardous chemicals. Meeting these policy objectives would
reduce market failures associated with information
asymmetries, help shift the chemical market toward improved
transparency and accountability, and reduce the competitive
advantage linked to use of toxic substances.
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